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Economic Perspectives 
Inter-generational equity and the Strategic Review of Water 
Charges in Scotland
J. R. Cuthbert
Abstract
Since the foundation of Scottish Water in 2002, over 60% of its net new capital formation has been 
funded direct from customer charges. This runs explicitly counter to Ministerial policy at the start of the 
period, which was that net new capital formation should be financed from borrowing: and it effectively 
means that the Scottish Government has been able to use water charges as a concealed form of taxation. 
This paper explains how this situation came about, and identifies key resulting issues: these include:-
  Problems of intergenerational equity.
  The question of whether funding so much capital expenditure direct from revenue was cost 
justified at a time of historically low interest rates.
  The opportunity foregone to have lower water charges for the benefit of domestic customers and 
industry.
Current proposals for the forthcoming Strategic Review of Charges threaten to make these issues even 
more acute. The paper argues that what is needed now is a thorough review of the approach to water 
charging, to address the above issues.
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1.   Introduction
In any regulated utility which employs a significant amount of capital assets, a key issue is how to ensure 
fairness between different generations of charge payers. In other words, the problem is to ensure that 
the costs of providing long-lived capital assets are spread through time in a way which equitably reflects 
the profile of benefits which the assets will provide to successive cohorts of customers.
One traditional solution to this problem was to fund the creation of capital assets by borrowing. It was 
generally felt that an equitable and prudent level of net borrowing would equate to the amount of new 
capital assets being created: that is, the net increase in debt of the company in a period should equal the 
quantity (gross investment  depreciation). This is actually the principle which the Scottish Executive 
held to in relation to water, in the period following Scottish devolution. For example, Ministers want 
to ensure that the balance between charges and borrowing remains appropriate, and hence the total 
borrowing should approximate to the value of new assets over the strategic review period. (source: 
internal Scottish Executive memo, dated 3rd February 2004, obtained under Freedom of Information.)
One thing which is very striking, however, is the extent to which the above principle endorsed by the 
Scottish Executive has not been met, since the creation of Scottish Water in 2002. Since 2002, in cash 
terms, net new investment by Scottish Water has been about £3.4 billion: (that is, the difference between 
gross investment of £7.8 billion, and depreciation of £4.4 billion). Over the period, however, the debt of 
Scottish Water increased by about £1.3 billion. That is, over 60% of Scottish Waters net new investment 
has been funded, not by borrowing, (as the original Scottish Executive principle would have implied), 
but direct from customer charges.
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Note that it is not being argued here that funding such a large proportion of net new capital direct from 
customer charges is necessarily wrong: indeed, a paper by Cuthbert and Cuthbert (2009), specifically 
made the case for funding capital direct from revenue, provided that customers were then appropriately 
compensated for what, in effect, was a loan they were making to Scottish Water. The important point 
being made in the current paper is that, once one method for securing inter-generational fairness has 
been abandoned, (as it has been in Scotland), then inter-generational equity issues have to be explicitly 
addressed. These issues have not been addressed in the successive strategic reviews of water charges 
in Scotland. Moreover, as will be shown in this paper, what is currently being proposed for the next 
strategic review of charges actually makes the equity problem significantly worse.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives background on the water industry in Scotland. 
Section 3 looks at the history of investment and borrowing since the inception of Scottish Water, and 
identifies important issues which have not been adequately tackled. Section 4 considers the approach 
currently proposed in the next strategic review of charges, and identifies why this is likely to make current 
problems considerably worse. Section 5 draws conclusions, and makes recommendations.
2.   Background
Scottish Water, the body responsible for delivering water and waste treatment services in Scotland, is 
a public corporation. Its annual revenue, mainly from customer charges, was £1.149 billion in 2016/17, 
of which the majority, £840 million, came from domestic supply to households. Almost £300 million 
of Scottish Water revenue came from the non-household, (that is, mainly business), customers. (Note, 
however, that this latter figure understates the final cost of water services to industry, because it represents 
the wholesale cost of water services supplied to non-household customers. In the non-household sector, 
Scottish Water acts as a wholesaler, providing services to what are known as licensed providers, who 
then provide retail services to non-household customers.) Scottish Water is a very significant investor in 
capital assets: its gross capital investment is commonly around £500 million or so per annum.
An important issue is how the arrangements for financing Scottish Waters capital expenditure interact 
with the Scottish Budget, and with the Treasurys arrangements for controlling departmental expenditure.
In common with conventional Government departments, the expenditure of the Scottish Government falls 
into two main categories from the point of view of Treasury control: namely, expenditure covered by the 
Scottish Governments Departmental Expenditure Limit, (DEL), and expenditure falling into the annually 
managed expenditure, (AME), category. Expenditure falling under the DEL is that expenditure which 
can, in principle, be planned in advance  like expenditure on health, or education. AME expenditure, by 
contrast is that expenditure which is inherently unpredictable  the classic example is social security. 
As the name implies, DEL is a control total: in each of the regular five year spending reviews, every 
department has a set of DEL limits for each of the five years, within which it has to manage its overall 
expenditure. In fact, the situation is slightly more complicated than this: the overall DEL limit is split 
into two components: one, resource DEL, (RDEL), covering resource, that is current, expenditure: and 
the other, CDEL, covering capital. Each department has to manage its resource and capital expenditure 
within these totals each year.
For most of the period covered in this paper, the Scottish Governments resource and capital DELs were 
determined exogenously, by the operation of the Barnett formula, while latterly receipts generated by 
taxes devolved to Scotland have also come in. Within the resulting RDEL and CDEL totals, the Scottish 
Government is able to determine its own priorities, and how to allocate finance to these priorities. So if 
the Scottish Government makes a saving on one category of expenditure which scores against its CDEL, 
it can then spend more on other capital items  as long as the overall CDEL limit is not breached.
This is where things get interesting in relation to Scottish Water. Scottish Water has, essentially, two 
ways of funding capital expenditure. It can either spend any money it may have as an operating surplus 
directly on capital investment: (which amounts to funding capital expenditure direct from customer 
charges). Or it can borrow from the Scottish Government to fund capital expenditure.
Because Scottish Water is a public corporation, only some of its activities count against the DEL of its 
parent department, (in this case, the parent department is the Scottish Government). The Treasurys 
rules on this are set out in its Consolidated Budget Guidance. The key point is that it is only net lending 
from the Scottish Government to Scottish Water which counts against the Scottish Governments CDEL. 
In other words, any capital expenditure undertaken by Scottish Water which it funds direct from its 
operating surplus has no impact on the Scottish Governments CDEL: but any net borrowing by Scottish 
Water from the Scottish Government does score against the Scottish Governments CDEL.
This asymmetry in the way in which Scottish Waters capital expenditure impacts on the Scottish 
Governments DEL has the following implication. Suppose that Scottish Water is able to increase the 
amount of its capital expenditure funded from its operating surplus, so that it can reduce the amount it 
needs to borrow from the Scottish Government. This means that the amount which scores against the 
Scottish Governments CDEL will be reduced. Since the Scottish Government has complete freedom to 
allocate spend within its CDEL as it sees fit, this means that the Scottish Government will be able to 
spend more on some other area of capital expenditure, without breaching its CDEL limit. So, in effect, 
increasing the amount of Scottish Waters capital expenditure funded direct from customer charges 
frees up resources for the Scottish Government which can be spent on the Scottish Governments other 
capital priorities. This opens up the potential for water charges to be used as a form of stealth taxation 
resource for the Scottish Government.
Finally, the water industry in Scotland is regulated by the Water Industry Commission for Scotland, 
(WICS). The WICS is responsible for setting water charges. This is done on the basis of periodic Strategic 
Reviews of Charges, initially covering successive five year periods, though this has now been extended 
to seven years. The process starts with the Scottish Government providing Ministerial guidance, setting 
out in broad terms the objectives which Ministers want the review to achieve, and also, crucially, the 
amount of provision within the Scottish Governments CDEL which Ministers are willing to make available 
over the review period for lending to Scottish Water. The actual review of charges is then carried out by 
the WICS  but involves extensive consultation with both Scottish Water itself, and with a consultative 
body, the Customer Forum, designed to bring customer interests to bear on the price setting process.
3.   History of Scottish Water investment and borrowing
As noted in the introduction, since the creation of Scottish Water over 60% of net new investment has 
been funded direct from customer charges, (as opposed to borrowing). This section looks in more detail 
at how this has come about  and identifies key issues which appear to have been ignored as water 
charging policy evolved.
Table 1 shows, for each year since 2002, gross capital expenditure, depreciation, net investment, and 
Scottish Waters borrowing. Borrowing is also expressed as a fraction of net investment each year. The 
figures are taken from the annual accounts of Scottish Water. (Note too that the figures for depreciation 
are actually for depreciation and infrastructure maintenance costs from the accounts  so a broad 
concept of depreciation has been used.) As can be seen, while borrowing as a fraction of net investment 
has fluctuated from year to year, the fraction has been consistently less than one: and, indeed, in the last 
two years, (2015/16 and 2016/17), Scottish Water funded its investment programme without borrowing 
at all.
Since the only ways to fund Scottish Waters expenditure are by customer charges or borrowing, levels 
of borrowing are intrinsically bound up with the regime for setting water charges. Charging regimes are 
periodically reviewed in each successive Strategic Review of Charges. So it makes sense to aggregate 
the figures in Table 1 into the relevant Strategic Review periods. This is done in Table 2. (The complete 
strategic review periods covered in Table 2 are 2002-06, 2006-10, and 2010-15: for completeness, note 
that the next two strategic review periods cover 2015-21, and 2021-27.) Table 2 also shows the public 
expenditure provision which the Scottish Government made available during each review period, to 
cover Scottish Water borrowing. 
Table 1: Scottish Water Investment and Borrowing by year (£ million)
Final year 
beginning
Gross capital 
expenditure
Depreciation and 
maintenance
Net investment Borrowing
Borrowing/ 
net investment 
(fraction)
2002 369.6 245.1 124.5 51.3 0.41
2003 377.8 262 115.8 42 0.36
2004 513.1 259.2 253.9 82 0.32
2005 655 250.5 404.5 162.1 0.40
2006 455.4 225.1 230.3 0 0.00
2007 636.5 250.8 385.7 196.3 0.51
2008 721.2 265.8 455.4 161.3 0.35
2009 648.3 326.9 321.4 270.2 0.84
2010 443.4 298 145.4 107.4 0.74
2011 490.7 333.7 157 51.6 0.33
2012 487.4 329.6 157.8 101.7 0.64
2013 475.2 334.5 140.7 27.4 0.19
2014 470 361.8 108.2 70.5 0.65
2015 479 345.9 133.1 0 0.00
2016 626.6 365.2 261.4 0 0.00
Total 7849.2 4454.1 3395.1 1323.8 0.39
Source: Scottish Water Annual Accounts
As can be seen from Table 2, in each review period, actual borrowing fell significantly short of provision, 
and in two of the three review periods, provision fell short of net investment. Over the period from 2002 
to 2016 as a whole, (that is, including the first two years of the 2015-21 review period), net investment 
was £3.4 billion: Scottish Government public expenditure provision for Scottish Water borrowing was 
£2.3 billion: and actual borrowing was £1.3 billion. In other words, the overall difference between net 
investment and borrowing divides almost equally into a shortfall of provision relative to net investment, 
and a shortfall of borrowing relative to provision.
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Table 2: Scottish Water Investment, Borrowing and Provision: Strategic Review Periods (£ million)
Strategic 
Review Period
Gross capital 
expenditure
Depreciation 
and 
maintenance
Net investment Borrowing
Borrowing/ net 
investment
Borrowing 
Provision
2002-06 1915.5 1016.8 898.7 337.4 0.38 600
2006-10 2461.4 1068.6 1392.8 627.8 0.45 728
2010-15 2366.7 1657.6 709.1 358.6 0.51 750
Subtotal 6743.6 3743 3000.6 1323.8 0.44 2078
2015 only 479 345.9 133.1 0 0.00 120
2016 only 626.6 365.2 261.4 0 0.00 120
Total 7849.2 4454.1 3395.1 1323.8 0.39 2318
Source: Scottish Water Annual Accounts 1
In fact, quite different charging regimes applied as between the first, (2002-06), Strategic Review period, 
and the two later review periods covered in Table 2.
In the first period, Ministerial policy was, (as noted in the introduction), that borrowing should equal 
net investment. However, during this period, the Scottish Executive were introducing a then new 
budgetary control regime, called Resource Accounting and Budgeting, (subsequently withdrawn in 
2003). Unfortunately, a number of mistakes were made in setting the budgetary control limits for water 
under this new regime. One of the mistakes meant, for example, that that element of depreciation called 
infrastructure renewal expenditure was double counted in the control limit set by the Scottish Executive. 
Overall, the mistakes meant that Scottish Water could not actually borrow up to level expected by the 
Scottish Executive, without breaching its Resource Accounting and Budgeting control limit. The effect 
was the significant shortfall in borrowing observed during the first strategic review period  and that 
resulted in water charges during the first review period being significantly higher than what would have 
been required if ministerial policy on borrowing had been met. (Mistakes in the application of Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting control were pointed out in Cuthbert and Cuthbert, (2003). Cuthbert and 
Cuthbert, (2006), gives a definitive account of the errors in the application of the control limit.)
In the next two Strategic Reviews of Charges, a completely different charging regime was implemented. 
Ministers had, by this stage, abandoned the position that net new investment should be funded by 
borrowing, but instead took the view that what was required was water charges which were affordable 
and stable  and, (in the case of the 2010-15 review), did not rise by more than inflation. The charging 
model that was introduced in Scotland was the current cost Regulatory Capital Value model, as applied to 
the privatised water companies in England. Unfortunately, (as analysed in detail in a paper by J. Cuthbert, 
(2012)), the current cost Regulatory Capital Value method is itself flawed, and generates a windfall 
surplus for the operating company on any approved capital investment it undertakes. In England, this 
resulted in the excessive dividends available to the equity owners of the privatised water companies. In 
Scotland, this charging method introduced a bias in Scottish Water activities towards capital intensive 
solutions. It also meant that the excess cash generated from customer charges by the regulatory capital 
value approach was available to fund capital expenditure directly, so reducing borrowing levels.
1 Annual Accounts for figures on investment and borrowing. For borrowing provision, figure for 2002-06 is planned level of borrowing 
as given in Scottish Executive evidence to Finance Committee on 4 February 2004: later figures from Scottish Government Principles 
of Charging for relevant review of charges.
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The overall result of the two flawed charging methodologies applied in successive Strategic Review of 
Charging periods has been the position observed in Tables 1 and 2  where more than 60% of net new 
capital investment has been funded direct from customer charges. This has been very convenient for the 
Scottish Government, who have had to put in £2 billion less by way of public expenditure support than 
if they had stuck to Ministers original intention of funding net new capital expenditure from borrowing: 
and £1 billion less than the provision they actually made available. These sums have been available to 
spend elsewhere on Scottish Government capital programmes: effectively, the Scottish Government 
has been able to use water charges as a concealed tax, worth between £1 billion and £2 billion over 
the period. It has also been very convenient for Scottish Water  who have operated throughout in a 
cash rich environment, able to demonstrate their financial strength, and never near breaching their 
borrowing limits. 
Of course, using water charges as a form of taxation means that water charges in Scotland may have 
been unreasonably high over the period. This is not a question on which one would wish to rush to any 
quick or simplistic conclusion  after all, there are other perfectly legitimate and fair charging regimes, 
as well as simply funding all net new capital expenditure from borrowing. Before reaching a conclusion, 
one would need to take a view on the following three issues. 
First of all, if significant amounts of capital expenditure are being funded direct from charges, then issues 
of equity have to be explicitly considered. Under the Regulatory Capital Value system as it was applied 
in Scotland, it was almost as if the unfortunate customer is, first of all, being forced to provide a lump 
sum for capital investment: and then being charged loan charges, (via future regulatory capital value 
charges), for the capital they themselves have provided. This problem has been recognised elsewhere  
but not in Scotland. Witness the following quotation from a reference book on utility regulation issued 
under the auspices of the World Bank: The regulator may consider customer provided capital to be 
an interest free loan to the operator, in which case the operator receives no return on that portion of 
its regulated assets, or the regulator may impute to the operator an interest payment on the customer 
provided capital, the effect of which is to lower the operators regulated prices. (Jamison et al, 2004) 
This is a key issue which should have been addressed before the regulatory capital value method was 
applied in Scotland: but it was not. (A specific proposal to address this issue was, in fact, made in the 
paper by Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2009: this would have involved regarding customer financed capital as 
a notional loan to the utility: but the proposal was not taken up.)
Secondly, another issue which should have been considered relates to the implications of the very low 
interest rates, (particularly public sector interest rates), which have been available to borrowers since 
2008. If real interest rates are negative, as they have been for part of this period, then it is actually 
cheaper to fund capital by borrowing than direct from customer charges. This statement holds in two 
different senses. First of all, if real interest rates are negative then the net present value of the stream 
of loan charges resulting from a single capital investment, discounted at the rate of inflation, will be 
less than the sum originally invested. So in real terms, borrowing is then cheaper than funding capital 
direct from revenue. But it is also true if real interest rates are negative that, if roughly the same amount 
of capital in real terms is being invested every year, then in the long run loan charges each year from 
financing the capital by borrowing will be less than the cost of funding the capital direct from revenue. 
So funding capital direct from revenue, if real interest rates are negative, will impose extra costs on the 
consumer, compared with funding capital by borrowing: not just in the short term, but also in the long 
term.
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The third issue which ought to have been considered is the question of opportunity cost. As has been 
seen, the Scottish Government has effectively used water charges as a form of taxation since 2002  to 
the tune of £1 billion or so. There have been costs attached to this option  not just in terms of higher 
charges for individual household and business consumers, but also because the opportunity has been 
lost to use significantly lower water charges for commercial users as an inducement for industry to locate 
in Scotland. It is worth remembering that the steep increase in water charges in the 2002-06 strategic 
review period was quoted as one of the reasons Scottish and Newcastle chose to re-locate their brewing 
operations from Edinburgh to the North East of England. Far from discouraging industry, a different 
policy on water charges could have been a powerful attractor for industry to develop in Scotland.
These three issues should have been at the forefront of successive strategic reviews of charges, but 
appear not to have been. If these issues had been explicitly addressed, then it seems very unlikely that 
the charging decisions which were actually made would have proceeded. In this sense, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that water consumers in Scotland have been significantly overcharged since the 
creation of Scottish Water, to the detriment of individual customers, and Scottish industry.
4.   How the next Review of Charges threatens to make matters worse
It might have been hoped that these issues would have been addressed at least in the next Strategic 
Review of Charges for period 2021-27, for which consultation is now getting underway. In fact, as will 
now be seen, current indications are that the next review is likely to make matters worse, rather than 
better.
Details on the Water Industry Commissions thinking on the next review were published in nine Initial 
Decision Papers, (IDP), in 2017. These papers identify what factors are likely to impact on prices, and 
look at issues like service levels, and the requirement for different types of capital investment.
Central to the price setting process are, of course, the question of likely levels of borrowing, and of 
capital investment.
IDP paper 2 gives the following indication on borrowing: It seems unlikely that the Scottish Government 
will make more than £100 million available in the next regulatory review period: . we have used a base 
case of £80 million annually in our modelling.
It is interesting to set this figure for projected borrowing against the levels of net new capital investment 
foreseen in the IDP papers. IDP8, (on page 2), gives the following indications of this. First of all, Scottish 
Water invests around £500 million each year: around 50% of this has been for capital maintenance  
the remaining 50% relating to growth and enhancement. This implies that Scottish Waters current 
investment for growth and enhancement is around £250 million per annum. And later on, IDP8 states 
that - The Commissions provisional view is that expenditure on enhancement projects should be broadly 
similar in real terms to that which Scottish Water has delivered in previous regulatory periods. Assuming 
that growth investment is also maintained, (as seems likely, given that new connections are increasing), 
this implies that net new capital investment will be around £250 million per annum.
Overall, what this implies is that the Commission is envisaging that £80 million of the £250 million net 
new investment would be met by borrowing: that is, 32%. (In fact, given the £250 million is a real figure, 
the actual percentage funded by borrowing would be less, once the £250 million is uprated for inflation.) 
In other words, it is envisaged that about 70% or so of net new capital investment in the next strategic 
review period will be met direct from customer charges. This would be slightly larger than the position 
in historic review periods  indicating that the issues identified in the previous section are certainly not 
being addressed.
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However, this is far from being the end of the story. Closer reading of the IDP papers indicates that the 
actual percentage of net new capital investment funded from customer charges is actually likely to be 
a good deal higher than the figure of 70% noted above  probably closer to 100%. And it also indicates 
how the forthcoming strategic review, far from resolving inter-generational equity issues, is likely to 
make matters a good deal worse.
The problem arises from the strategic reviews treatment of investment on maintenance and replacement. 
This is the topic of IDP7. What is done there is a very rough analysis based on the Modern Equivalent 
Asset Value, (MEAV), of Scottish Water: (the MEAV is an estimate of what would have to be spent now 
to replace the asset base of Scottish Water with a modern, fully functioning, equivalent.) The MEAV is 
estimated at some £40 billion to £60 billion. This sum is then divided in IDP7 by estimates of the average 
asset life of Scottish Water assets, to get estimates of what might have to be spent each year to maintain 
Scottish Waters existing stock, if the burden of maintenance and replacement were evenly spread.  Since 
these estimates are a good deal higher than the current spend on maintenance and replacement, the 
conclusion is drawn that the condition of the asset base is currently likely to be deteriorating. 
This is actually a very poor argument. A lot of the value of the MEAV will be tied up in extremely long 
lived assets  like the Loch Katrine scheme. So even aside from the problem of estimating a meaningful 
average length of life for Scottish Water assets, much of the replacement cost is likely to fall far into the 
future: so the assumption of an even spread of replacement costs is untenable. Further, when major 
assets come to be replaced, there will inevitably be significant elements of enhancement involved in the 
replacement: so treating replacement as an activity which is largely independent from enhancement is 
unjustified.
To give the IDP papers some credit, they acknowledge some of these problems. But what the papers 
then do is to argue that, nevertheless, customers need to spend more now, in order to provide for future 
replacement. A key quote from IDP7 is: it appears that insufficient attention has been paid (by both 
regulator and regulated company) to futureproofing levels of service. .. An important consideration 
is the extent to which todays customers make an appropriate contribution towards the ultimate cost of 
replacing the assets that are in use.
The implications of this line of thought are startling. If it is carried through, then additional charges will 
be added in to customers bills over the strategic review period in order to provide, in some sense, for 
future replacement expenditure. Because of this extra cash, actual borrowing would then fall below 
the 30% of net new investment which, as has been noted, the IDP papers envisage. The likelihood is 
that, over the strategic review period, customers would end up paying for all, or almost all, net new 
investment directly via charges.
This would raise yet a further issue of inter-generational equity. It is already the case that customers 
are funding, direct from charges, a very significant portion of net new investment  without adequate 
recompense. But the forthcoming strategic review threatens to go a stage beyond this, forcing customers 
not only to fund current new investment from revenue  but also to make a contribution to future 
investment. This is an entirely new question of inter-generational equity  which needs to be added to 
the list of issues identified in the previous section as urgently needing to be addressed. 
5.   Conclusion
One normal principle for funding capital expenditure is to borrow to fund the provision of new capital 
assets  and to spread the costs over the lifetime of the assets by funding the resulting borrowing 
charges out of future customer revenues. This is not the only possible approach: but it does involve a 
consistent rationale as regards inter-generational fairness.
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By accident or design, the approach to water charging adopted in Scotland has turned this normal 
principle on its head. The bulk of the formation of net new capital assets is now funded direct from 
customers charges  without the issues of potential unfairness involved in this being addressed. And 
if the questionable logic underlying the current proposals for the Strategic Review of Charges 2021-27 
is followed through, we will move even further towards a position where customers fund not only the 
current creation of new capital assets direct from charges  but also make a contribution now towards 
the costs of the future replacement of these assets.
The current situation, and even more the future proposals, raise profound issues of equity, which need 
to be addressed. But in addition, other issues also need to be brought into consideration: in particular:-
  At a time when real interest rates have been negative, is it correct to adopt the more expensive 
approach of funding capital direct from revenue, rather than by borrowing?
  Funding so much capital direct from revenue has meant that Scotland has forfeited the opportunity 
of using relatively low water charges as a potential inducement for industry to locate in Scotland.
There are further downsides to the current policy. The relatively high water charges implicit in the policy 
of using water charges as a concealed tax have the effect of turning Scottish Water into a cash cow  
and hence a relatively tempting target for future privatisation. In addition, once the Scottish Government 
becomes used to not having to provide borrowing support for Scottish Water, it will find itself very 
reluctant, or even unable, to turn this facility back on when needed. If large lumps of replacement 
investment are going to be required at some point in the future  then the logical approach will be to fund 
such investment in the usual way, by borrowing. Current policies are likely to choke off the availability of 
this option within the public sector  hence increasing the risk of eventual privatisation.
All in all, this paper argues that there is a clear need now for a root and branch review of the charging 
policy for water in Scotland, in order to address a whole set of issues which the current system has 
proved itself incapable of tackling.
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